Carmen ACHIMESCU*
Maria BEBEC**
University of Bucharest
Abstract: This paper examines whether the international community, through inaction or selective engagement, has become complicit in perpetuating the Palestinian crisis. It traces the historical evolution of Palestine’s international status from the Balfour Declaration and British Mandate to the United Nations’ post-1945 framework. It highlights how geopolitical power asymmetries undermine the enforcement of international law. It further discusses the increasing “judicialisation” of the Palestinian issue, including recent proceedings and critiques the double standards of major powers in applying humanitarian norms. Finally, it contrasts the competing reconstruction and peace agendas proposed by the United States and Arab States, revealing a new structural paradox in global governance.
Keywords: Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Humanitarian Crisis, Reconstruction Plans.
Introduction
More than two years after the war in Palestine began, the toll is disastrous, especially for the civilian population, who are automatically associated with Hamas during attacks. According to Humanitarian Situation Update #327, published by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs on 2 October 2025, the inhabitants of Gaza City have increasingly limited access to means of survival amid intensified bombing. Utility networks are collapsing, and numerous humanitarian organizations are being forced to suspend their activities in the territory. Currently, only eight kitchens are operational in Northern Gaza, and one million people have access to less than the emergency minimum of six liters of drinking water per day. Medical infrastructure continues to be targeted, while the UN and its partners face various obstacles that prevent them from providing assistance in the Gaza Strip.[1] Between 7 October 2023 and 30 October 2025, the date of publication of the 336th Humanitarian Situation Update on the Gaza Strip, 68,643 Palestinian casualties and 170,655 injuries were recorded. Of these, 104 Palestinians were killed between 28 and 29 October 2025 alone.[2]
This devastation generates a fundamental question: has the international community become complicit, by inaction or selective engagement, in perpetuating the Palestinian crisis?
First, we notice that most of the legal studies related to Palestine examine the non-application, performativity and normative dimension of international rules and that little attention has been given to the historical process of their production.[3] From this perspective, a questioning about the foundational principles, such as the international mandate and self-determination, is useful to clarify the legal meaning of both past and ongoing colonial dynamics. The analysis should begin with the Balfour Declaration, the ideological basis of the 1922 British Mandate, and trace the evolution of this legal framework within the UN system after 1945[4].
Secondly, as dr. Insaf Rezagui has shown in a recent article[5], Palestine’s relationship with the United Nations has evolved through several distinct phases: a period of mistrust from 1947 to 1967, a phase of questioning from 1967 to 1988, a stage of consolidation from 1988 to 2009, and a period of assertion from 2009 onward. Nevertheless, the UN’s role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict also reveals a “paradox”. While the gradual recognition of Palestine (culminating in a status of non-member observer state as from 2012) symbolizes a commitment to self-determination, the Security Council’s persistent deadlock, enabled by the US veto, reflects the persistent influence of power politics and colonial logic. Moreover, we can identify a significant reluctance of many states to address the issue through a colonial lens or to support coercive measures. While UN resolutions and commissions reports on Palestine have proliferated, the United States has constantly used its Security Council veto (at least 88 times) to block action or implementation in favor of Palestinians. However, between 1947 and 2024 the General Assembly adopted 309 resolutions on Palestine, none of which led to concrete sanctions against Israel.[6]
We do not entirely agree with dr Insaf Rezgaui conclusion that current conflict in Gaza exposes a total failure of the international order to enforce the law and its active role in sustaining Israeli colonial domination through silence and inaction[7]. The UN mission was from the first beginning an impossible one: making two incompatible peoples living together on the same land. Nevertheless, we share the author’s opinion that the colonial status quo in Palestine is a combined effect of two types of actions. On one hand, the support that Britain and later the United States gave to the colonization of Palestine consolidated Israel position in the international community. On the other hand, the so-called “Arab solidarity” with Palestine, often served as a pretext for rival regimes to appropriate this symbolic cause, also meant persecutions against Palestinians who tried to resist such manipulation ant factional rivalries. These factions have, from the very beginning, undermined and weakened Palestinian capacity to build a state, culminating in the division between Fatah in Ramallah and Hamas in Gaza.
As we have showed in a previous study[8], over the time, the international community’s message to the warring parties was rather consistent: regardless of the jus ad bellum, full respect for jus in bello is mandatory during an armed conflict. If the legitimacy of Israel’s use of force in Gaza since October 2023 remains unresolved, UN resolutions and international efforts have nevertheless focused on the resulting humanitarian crisis. Civilian casualties on both sides are undeniable and protecting life and human dignity should be, first, an Israeli-Palestinian shared goal. Yet, this goal always seems secondary, as both Israel and Hamas have reacted disproportionately, violating international humanitarian law through their attacks.
1. A structural paradox of international law
As Professor François Dubuisson emphasizes[9], the Israeli–Palestinian conflict illustrates both the strength and fragility of international law. It is one of the most normatively dense conflicts in modern history, governed by hundreds of UN resolutions, legal opinions, and conventions. Yet, international law has failed to produce decisive political or humanitarian outcomes. Israel’s persistent occupation, the expansion of settlements, and the displacement of Palestinians persist despite international condemnation. This “paradox” reveals the structural limits of international law, lacking coercive enforcement mechanisms. Compliance depends on political will and good faith and powerful actors, who use their influence and veto power to shield Israel from accountability. Consequently, while international law provides a solid normative framework, its effectiveness remains constrained by geopolitical asymmetry.
Professor Jean-Pierre Filiu, author of book “Comment la Palestine fut perdue: et pourquoi Israël n’a pas gagné: histoire d’un conflit” goes even further, pointing out that the enduring injustice inflicted upon the Palestinian people was a trigger for the progressive militarization of international relations. The collapse of the United Nations system, paralyzed for decades by Washington’s protection of Israel, continued with Moscow’s obstruction over Syria and then with the war in Ukraine.[10]
Even though the situation between Israel and Palestine may appears as a bilateral conflict, in its Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) recalls that the Palestinian question concerns the entire United Nations, which has been addressing it since 1947, when the General Assembly adopted Resolution 181 (II) Future Government of Palestine.[11] In this context, the ICJ reiterates the mandate conferred on the General Assembly and the Security Council in 2004 by its Wall Advisory Opinion[12], according to which they must redouble their efforts to end this conflict, which threatens international peace and security.[13] However, more than 20 years later, lasting peace in the Middle East seems an elusive prospect, with consequences also being felt in terms of the United Nations’ efforts to fulfill the purposes outlined in Article 1 of its funding Charter.
The Middle East question raises the most complex issues of international law – from the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and the prohibition of forced deportations to sovereignty over occupied territory, colonisation, legitimate defence and crimes against humanity, specifically genocide. While the international community’s response to these threats should exemplify the effectiveness of international law, the situation in Palestine reveals deep divisions among states regarding their commitment to international law.
At the UN level, the policy for managing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is fragmented, with some bodies and states being more willing than others to stabilise relations in the Middle East. Although certain bodies and states attempt to counterbalance the isolationist actions of others, the influence that the latter exert in the international arena remains decisive. For instance, the General Assembly has adopted numerous resolutions on the conflict in an attempt to overcome, as far as possible, the deadlock in the Security Council resulting from the United States’ veto, which it has exercised seven times since the war began in 2023.[14]
2. Gaza war and judiciarisation of the Palestinian issue
The Gaza war of 2023–2025 has intensified calls for legal accountability. Both Hamas and Israel have been scrutinized under international humanitarian and criminal law. A wave of judicial proceedings were initiated before the ICJ and International Criminal Court (ICC). Since the beginning of the conflict, the ICJissued an Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Prolonged Occupation (19 July 2024); ordered provisional measures in the dispute South Africa v. Israel (Application of the Genocide Convention, provisional measures, 26 January 2024); was addressed with a new application Nicaragua v. Germany (alleged complicity to genocide through military aid) and delivered a new Advisory Opinion on Israel’s Humanitarian Obligations (25 October 2025).The ICC issued arrest warrants (21 November 2024) for senior Israeli and Hamas officials for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity.
This extraordinary judicial mobilization reflects what professor Dubuisson calls the “judicialisation of the Palestinian question”[15], a shift from political negotiation to lawfare. He also references earlier cases, such as Application of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination Qatar v. United Arab Emirates (2018) and Ukraine v. Russian Federation (2017), noting an increasing readiness of States to use the ICJ for human rights and humanitarian law issues, a trend mirrored in Palestine’s strategy.
We share the author’s conclusion that, while the ICJ cannot enforce its judgments, its opinions and decisions carry substantial symbolic authority and contribute to the legal framing of political disputes. The mobilisation of the Court around Palestine reflects both faith in international legality and frustration with political paralysis at the UN Security Council and it reinforces international norms, such as the prohibition of acquisition of territory by force and the right to self-determination. In the same time, it also exposes the limits of international justice when confronted with persistent impunity.
3. Complicity and the Responsibility of States
As previously mentioned, on 26 January 2024, the ICJ issued an order imposing a series of provisional measures on Israel, noting “at least some of the rights asserted by South Africa under the Genocide Convention are plausible”.[16] Thus, the Court acted to preserve “the right of the Palestinians in Gaza to be protected from acts of genocide.”[17] Despite the fact that the ICJ identified the premises of genocide against the Palestinian population, a crime against humanity with well-known consequences, Israel continued its operations without being hindered in any way by the international community. Not only were Israel’s actions not condemned by numerous key actors, many of them were also supported economically, through the supply of weapons by countries such as Germany, and diplomatically by countries such as the United States, which blocked Security Council resolutions seeking to achieve a ceasefire.
Over a year and a half ago, the ICJ identified signs that Israel intended to destroy all or part of the Palestinian population. This is an essential condition in determining whether certain behaviours constitute genocide. In her most recent report on 20 October 2025, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, Francesca Albanese, no longer nuances the accusation of genocide.[18]
Entitled “Gaza Genocide: a collective crime”, the report lists behaviors that the Special Rapporteur condemns as acts of complicity in the genocide in Palestine. At the same time, in arguing her case, the Special Rapporteur also refers to the conclusions of the UN Commission of Inquiry of 16 September 2025[19], according to which Israel is committing genocide in the Gaza Strip, so that states have an obligation to stop these actions and not to support or finance them, and to hold those responsible to account.[20]
From the Special Rapporteur’s perspective, there were four channels of complicity on the part of the international community, namely diplomatic, economic, military, and humanitarian.[21] While it is well known that the United States supported Israel’s interests when a permanent ceasefire was being sought, Albanese notes that they are not the only supporters of Israel. Thus, the Special Rapporteur focuses on the example of countries such as Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, sometimes joined by the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands, which have behaved in a contradictory manner, as they initially took action to put pressure on Israel, criticizing the planned invasion of Rafah, but later withdrew their funding for UNRWA.[22]
The Special Rapporteur also expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of support for legal proceedings before international courts, criticizing the fact that only 13 states supported South Africa before the ICJ and no state supported Nicaragua in its proceedings against Germany. Moreover, the US imposed sanctions against the International Criminal Court following the issuance of arrest warrants for Prime Minister Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza.[23]
While positive measures were identified, such as the recognition of the Palestinian state by 20 new states, the suspension of diplomatic relations with Israel by Belize, Bolivia, Colombia and Nicaragua, and the downgrading of relations with Israel by Bahrain, Chad, Chile, Honduras, Jordan, Türkiye, and South Africa,[24] the Special Rapporteur emphasised that these measures were insufficient given the gravity of the situation on the ground and the support of states with significant financial and military potential. In this regard, the Special Rapporteur recalls the historical financial and military support provided by the United States to Israel, which has become “the leading recipient of US Foreign Military Financing (FMF)”.[25] Albanese also highlights Israel’s military collaboration with the United Kingdom[26] and Germany, the latter justifying its actions on the basis of post-Holocaust obligations towards Israel.[27]
Additionally, the Special Rapporteur criticises Israel’s actions on the grounds that they violate its humanitarian obligations. On the one hand, Albanese reiterates that Israel bombed UNRWA warehouses, food distribution points, schools, and clinics.[28] On the other hand, Israel has undermined UNRWA’s international standing by claiming that some of its staff were involved in the 7 October 2023 attacks, prompting several countries to immediately suspend their funding. At the same time, Israel promoted ad hoc pseudo-humanitarian agencies.[29]
There is no doubt that the judicialisation of the Palestinian crisis was a response to the proliferation of forms of support for Israel within the international community, because international key players undermined the United Nations’s actions, an organisation whose “raison d’être” is to promote cooperation for the sake of international peace and security. Thus, we are witnessing an alternative approach, by means of competing plans to exploit the remaining occupied territory for reconstruction purposes. Therefore, after decades of tension, the Palestinian question appears to evolve into another dilemma, strategically created, on the one hand, by Israel’s key partner, the United States of America, and, on the other hand, by the Arab states neighboring the conflict.
4. Competing reconstruction and peace agendas: the US and the Arab plans
Having recently returned to the Oval Office at the White House in early 2025, Donald Trump was keen to bring an end to the conflict and swiftly begin the reconstruction of Gaza. Dubbed “the greatest friend Israel has ever had in the White House” by Netanyahu,[30] the US president proposed relocating the Palestinian population to neighbouring Arab states, clearing the territory of mines and transforming Gaza into a Riviera. Beyond concerns about the possibility of flagrantly violating international humanitarian law by displacing the population – a measure prohibited under the Fourth Geneva Convention – there was widespread criticism of reducing the Palestinian issue to business calculations.[31] In this context, Professors El Sakka and Porteilla described the Trump plan as a deal – a mercantile approach that was deemed inappropriate for such a profound humanitarian and political crisis.[32] Professor Olivier Corten also highlights Donald Trump’s lack of interest for international law. This is exemplified by his proposal to transform Gaza into a “Riviera of the Middle East”, made without regard for legal norms, but also by his administration’s policy of withdrawing from treaties and international organizations, portraying legal instruments as inadequate for restoring “America’s greatness” or even suggesting potential territorial expansion in Greenland, Panama, or Canada. This reflects an unprecedented trend of sidelining legality as a framework for international relations, instead prioritizing power dynamics and transactional diplomacy[33].
By contrast, the more measured Arab plan did not seek to relocate the Palestinian population. Instead, it aimed to rebuild Gaza in stages, transfer control to the Palestinian Authority rather than Hamas, and train Palestinian police to maintain security in the area. Initially proposed by Egypt, the Arab plan was later unanimously approved by Arab leaders.[34] Several European leaders from countries such as France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom also immediately expressed their support for the Arab plan, viewing it as much more realistic than President Trump’s strategy.[35]
5. The US additional points
Against the backdrop of the ongoing deterioration of the situation in the territory, and the political and diplomatic opposition that prevented the US president from implementing his Gaza plan, a change of perspective was witnessed in autumn 2025. Donald Trump proposed a 20-point peace plan for Gaza,[36] some of which differed radically from his initial plan, such as no forced displacement. This time, the president emphasised the importance of freeing hostages and addressing humanitarian issues in the territory by allowing access to aid, rebuilding essential infrastructure, and rehabilitating hospitals and bakeries. Furthermore, he proposed establishing a “Board of Peace” to oversee the Palestinian Committee that would govern Gaza during the transition period. This board would be chaired by the President himself and would include former British Prime Minister Tony Blair. Hamas would withdraw completely from Gaza’s government. At the same time, the US proposed working with Arab states and other international partners to create a temporary International Stabilisation Force (ISF) to maintain security in Gaza.
Additionally, it was explicitly stated that Israel would not occupy or annex Gaza, with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) gradually handing over the territory it occupies in Gaza to the ISF. Although the UN and its agencies have returned to the discourse of the US president, their mandate seems limited to humanitarian issues, without any involvement in security matters. In this sense, experts who have studied the new US peace plan note that President Trump remains committed to an economic view of the problem.[37]
To a certain extent, Trump’s 20-point plan seems to echo Woodrow Wilson’s 14-point programme, which contained solutions for peace and reconstruction after the First World War. However, the two programmes are fundamentally different. While Wilson proposed the creation of the League of Nations, establishing multilateral diplomacy as corollary of international law, Trump seeks to undermine the UN’s role in re-establishing peace and security.
Conclusion
The Palestinian crisis showed the structural fragility of international law when confronted with geopolitical realities. Genuine progress would require a renewed commitment to international legality, multilateral cooperation and the protection of human dignity. Instead, the selective engagement of powerful states made possible the humanitarian disaster and the competing U.S. and Arab reconstruction plans, though different in scope, both reflect attempts to instrumentalise the crisis for strategic purposes.
*Associate Professor, University of Bucharest; carmen.achimescu@drept.unibuc.ro. The opinions expressed in this paper are solely the author’s and do not engage the institution he/she belongs to.
** PhD candidate, University Paris 1, maria.bebec@drept.unibuc.ro. The opinions expressed in this paper are solely the author’s and do not engage the institution he/she belongs to.
[1] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – Occupied Palestinian Territory, Humanitarian Situation Update #327 | Gaza Strip, 2 October 2025. Available at: https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-327-gaza-strip.
[2] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – Occupied Palestinian Territory, Humanitarian Situation Update #336: Gaza Strip, 30 October 2025. Available at: https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-336-gaza-strip.
[3] Sbeih Sbeih, La Palestine, de la SDN à l’ONU : histoire d’une hypocrisie occidentale, Recherches internationales 133, no. 2 (2025): 53-72, Éditions Association Paul Langevin
[4]Ardi Imseis, The United Nations and the Question of Palestine. Rule of Law and the Structure of International Legal Subalternity, 2023, Cambridge University Press
[5] Insaf Rezagui, Les Nations Unis et la perpétuation de l’ordre colonial Israélien en Palestine, Recherches internationales 133, no. 2 (2025): 89-103. Éditions Association Paul Langevin
[6] Insaf Rezagui, Un multilatéralisme de raison : la stratégie palestinienne au service de la reconnaissance de l’État de Palestine , doctoral thesis, Université Paris Cité, 26 November2024, https://theses.fr/s356364
[7] Insaf Rezagui, Les Nations Unis et la perpétuation de l’ordre colonial Israélien en Palestine, supra
[8] Carmen Achimescu, Maria Bebec, Le droit de la guerre et de la paix dans le conflit israélo-palestinien, Forum juridic 2/2023
[9] François Dubuisson, La mobilisation de la Cour internationale de justice dans la question de Palestine. Recherches internationales 133, no. 2 (2025): 105-122. Éditions Association Paul Langevin. DOI: 10.3917/rein.133.0105. Available at: https://shs.cairn.info/revue-recherches-internationales-2025-2-page-105?lang=fr.
[10] Jean-Pierre Filiu, Comment la Palestine fut perdue : et pourquoi Israël n’a pas gagné : histoire d’un conflit (XIXe-XXIe siècle), 2024, Editions Seuil
[11] ICJ, Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024, para. 35.
[12] Bogdan Aurescu, Ion Galea, Elena Lazar, Ioana Oltean, Scurta culegere de jurisprudenta, ed. Hamangiu, 2018, p. 156-159.
[13] Ibid., para. 282.
[14] Francesca Albanese (Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories occupied since 1967), Report: “Gaza Genocide: a collective crime” by the Special Rapporteur on the situation on human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967 (A/80/492), Advance unedited version, 20 October 2025, para. 22. Available at: https://www.un.org/unispal/document/special-rapporteur-report-gaza-genocide-a-collective-crime-20oct25/.
[15] François Dubuisson, supra
[16] ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel), Request for the indication of provisional measures, Order of 26 January 2024, para. 58.
[17] Ibid., para. 59.
[18] Special Rapporteur Albanese, “Gaza Genocide: a collective crime”.
[19] Special Rapporteur Albanese, “Gaza Genocide: a collective crime”, para. 16.
[20] Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Israel has committed genocide in the Gaza Strip, UN Commission finds,” 16 September 2025. Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/09/israel-has-committed-genocide-gaza-strip-un-commission-finds.
[21] Special Rapporteur Albanese, “Gaza Genocide: a collective crime”, para. 3.
[22] Special Rapporteur Albanese, “Gaza Genocide: a collective crime”, para. 22.
[23] Special Rapporteur Albanese, “Gaza Genocide: a collective crime”, para. 25.
[24] Special Rapporteur Albanese, “Gaza Genocide: a collective crime”, para. 29.
[25] Special Rapporteur Albanese, “Gaza Genocide: a collective crime”, para. 33.
[26] Special Rapporteur Albanese, “Gaza Genocide: a collective crime”, para. 38.
[27] Special Rapporteur Albanese, “Gaza Genocide: a collective crime”, para. 37.
[28] Special Rapporteur Albanese, “Gaza Genocide: a collective crime”, para. 50.
[29] Special Rapporteur Albanese, “Gaza Genocide: a collective crime”, paras. 50-51.
[30] NBC News, “Netanyahu Calls Trump ‘the Greatest Friend of Israel’ after all hostages are freed,” 2025. Video available at: https://www.nbcnews.com/now/video/netanyahu-calls-trump-the-greatest-friend-of-israel-after-all-hostages-are-freed-249760325719
[31] Abaher El Sakka, Raphaël Porteilla, Plan Trump et plan arabe : analyse critique des deux plans de «reconstruction pour Gaza ». Recherches internationales 133, no. 2 (2025), pp. 158-161, Éditions Association Paul Langevin. DOI: 10.3917/rein.133.0157. Available at: https://shs.cairn.info/revue-recherches-internationales-2025-2-page-157?lang=fr.
[32] Ibid., p. 159.
[33] Olivier Corten, Le droit international, objet d’influences et de conflit, Recherches internationales 133, no. 2 (2025): 169-182. Éditions Association Paul Langevin.
[34] Ibid., pp. 162-164.
[35]BBC News, “European leaders back ‘realistic’ Arab plan for Gaza”, 9 March 2025. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0rz0jvvpwwo.
[36]BBC News, “Trump’s 20-point Gaza peace plan in full”, 9 October 2025. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c70155nked7o.
[37] Leon Seidl, Trump’s 20 Points on Gaza – Liberal peacebuilding sans liberalism, or: Capitalism without a human face, EJIL: Talk! Blog of the European Journal of International Law, 3 October 2025, Available at: https://www.ejiltalk.org/trumps-20-points-on-gaza-liberal-peacebuilding-sans-liberalism-or-capitalism-without-a-human-face/.