Raluca-Andreea ȘOLEA*
PhD Student, University of Bucharest
Abstract: The aim of this research is to analyse the elements of the crime of terrorism encompassed within the relevant case law of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, in comparison with other definitions of terrorism, developed by international bodies. The study also aims at explaining what their relevance for the further development of a common agreed concept of the crime of terrorism is.. As it is well-known, so far, the crime of terrorism, despite its gravity and the threat that it poses to the international peace and security, is not regulated within the international law since the international community could not agree on a common notion of the terrorism offence. Thus, analysing the concepts of terrorism developed is of high importance. Because the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is competent in particular on the crime of terrorism, its case law appears of significant relevance.
Key-words: Lebanese criminal law, mens rea, customary international law, peace-time concepts of terrorism, distinct crime.
- Introduction
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (”STL”) has been established by an Agreement between the Lebanese Republic and the United Nations in accordance with the Security Council Resolution 1664,[1] at the request of the Government of Lebanon. It is competent to prosecute the crime of terrorism, committed in times of peace, namely the terrorist bombings that occurred in Lebanon in 2005 and killed the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and others.[2]
The applicable law is the national criminal law of Lebanon for the prosecution of the crime of terrorism.[3]Nevertheless, the Appeals Chamber of the STL considered appropriate to take into account the international standards as well since it is a tribunal of international character.[4]
This article will analyse the case Ayyash et al.,[5] since it is the most complex one. The Trial Chamber of the STL has already pronounced its Judgment,[6] and also the Sentencing Judgement[7] for Mr. Salim Ayyash.
Analyzing the case law of this Tribunal isimportant since it is the first jurisdiction of international relevance to consider terrorism as a distinct crime. This element differentiates it from the international criminal tribunals and courts such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY),[8] International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), which prosecuted war crimes and crimes against humanity.
This paper will focus on the elements of terrorism from both the definition of terrorism stipulated within the Lebanese law and the definition of terrorism developed by the Appeals Chamber as being part of the international customary law. As it will be emphasized, the latter element –represents a judicial innovation developed by the Tribunal. Built on the analysis, a comparison between the two concepts of terrorism will be drawn. The relevance of the STL case law for the further development of international law will be emphasized before presenting the concluding remarks.
The study analyses and brings into light the developments resulting from the case law of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, which was especially designed to judge the terrorism crime. It also analyses the elements of the crime terrorism, which derives from the jurisprudence, and makes also reference to other notions of terrorism developed by international bodies. Thus, the research might represent another step in the development of the notion of terrorism to be acknowledged by the international community.
- The concept and elements of the terrorism crime as encompassed in the Ayyash el al. Trial Chamber Judgement[9]
- An overview of the case
The accused in this case are four members of a Lebanese armed group, Hezbolah – Mr. Jamil Ayyash, Mr. Merhi, Mr. Oneissi and Mr. Sabra – because of their involvement in the bombing that killed the Lebanese politician Hariri and 21 others in Beirut on February 14, 2005. All four were tried in absentia, and Prosecutors have based their case on the evidence resulting from a phone network that monitored the prime minister Hariri months before his death.
Mr. Jamil Ayyash has been accused of five offences: conspiracy aimed at committing a terrorist act, committing a terrorist act by means of an explosive device, intentional homicide, the intentional attempted homicide, while the others have been accused only for conspiracy.[10] In the cases of Mr. Merhi, Mr. Oneissi and Mr. Sabra, when analysing the conspiracy offence, the Trial Chamber concluded that the Prosecution did not prove their guiltiness of conspiracy. Mr. Ayyash has been found guilty for committing a terrorist act by assassinating Mr. Hariri with the explosive device. The evidence was represented by the mobile activity of some users of Blue, Red and Green networkson the day of the attack.[11] This article will focus mainly on ”count two” – committing a terrorist act by means of an explosive device.
The Trial Chamber sentenced unanimously Mr. Ayyash to life imprisonment for each of the five counts he was found guilty of, since each of them had the sufficient gravity for the maximum sentence, the imprisonment for life.[12]
Currently, s, the case is in the appeal phase after the the Defence Counsel for Mr. Salim Jamil Ayyash and the Prosecution of the Tribunal have filed notices of Appeal against the Trial Chamber’s Judgment.[13] Furthermore, the Defence has also filed notices of Appeal against the Sentencing Judgment.[14] The Appeals Chamber is also seized of an appeal by the Prosecution against the Judgment in the case of Prosecutor v. Merhi and Oneissi.[15] At the moment at which this article is written, the latest development is represented by the fact that the pronouncement of the Appeal Judgment was scheduled for the 10th of March 2022.[16]
2.2 The elements of the terrorism offence according to the Trial Chamber Judgement
The Trial Chamber has made its judgement based on the national criminal law of Lebanon for the prosecution of the crime of terrorism. The Lebanese Criminal Code[17] incorporates a definition for the crime of terrorism. The elements of this crime will be further discussed.
The first element included in the definition of terrorism within Article 314 of the Lebanese Criminal Code[18] is the subjective element (mens rea) – the intended aim – to cause a state of terror. On the basis of elements of the terrorism offence from all the international and regional instruments against terrorism that contain a definition of terrorism, it can be argued that this element is the most common one. , It can be found in all the definitions of terrorism developed so far. This can be observed in the tables below, together with some other elements of the terrorism crime that will be emphasized within the article. The first table (Table 1) contains the elements of terrorism developed within the regional instruments against terrorism, while the second (Table 2) contains the elements of terrorism from other international conventions, UN Resolutions and last, but not least, the elements of terrorism found by the Appeals Chamber of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, as belonging to the definition of terrorism within customary international law.
Table 1 – The elements of terrorism within regional counter-terrorism instruments
| Intended aim | Motive | Means used | Scope | |
| 1998 League of Arab States Convention[19] | yes | no | yes | no |
| 1999 African Unity Convention[20] | yes | no | no | yes |
| 2001 Shanhai Cooperation Convention[21] | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| 2002 EU Framework Decision[22] | yes | yes | yes | yes |
Table 2 – The elements of terrorism from international instruments and the jurisprudence of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
| Intended aim | Motive | Means Used | Scope | |
| 1937 League of Nation’s Convention[23] | yes | no | Yes | no |
| 1954 ILC Draft Code[24] | yes | no | Yes | no |
| 1991 ILC Draft Code[25] | yes | no | No | no |
| 1995 ILC Draft Code[26] | yes | no | No | yes |
| 1972 US Draft Convention[27] | yes | no | No | no |
| 1998 Draft Rome Statute[28] | yes | yes | Yes | no |
| 2000 UN DCC[29] | yes | yes | Yes | no |
| 2004 UN SC Res. 1566[30] | yes | yes | No | yes |
| Lebanese Criminal Code[31] | yes | no | Yes | Yes |
| STL Appeals Chamber Definition[32] | yes | yes | Yes | Yes |
Both tables, which represent the result of our previous research concerning the elements of the concept of terrorism developed so far within the international law, emphasize the fact that the ‘intended aim’ element is of utmost importance for the notion of terrorism since it is encompassed in many regional and international counter-terrorism instruments. The ‘intended aim’ element is also included in the definition of the crime of terrorism in the Lebanese Criminal Code[33] and in the customary definition of the crime of terrorism, as identified by the Appeals Chamber of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.[34]
The Appeals Chamber of the STL found that the subjective element is one’s deliberate action with the intent to cause a state of terror.[35] From the meaning that the Appeals Chamber gave to the stipulation of the Article 314 of the Lebanese Criminal Code,[36] one can understand that terrorism should be perceived as a crime of a special intent (dolus specialis). In addition, the means used, the detonating of a bomb, – shows the intention to cause a state of terror, especially as the conduct has occurred in a crowded market place. Consequently, the terrorism offence committed by the perpetrators, Mr. Ayyash and his accomplices, satisfies the special intent requirement for a terrorist act as stipulated within Art. 314.[37]
If one analyses the case law of the Lebanese domestic courts, even if the prime intent of the perpetrator was not to cause a state of terror among the general public, but among a particular group, the intent is still sufficient for the person responsible to be held accountable.[38] The main reason is that even if the public might not have been the principal target, the action has created “danger” within the general public. The precedent of Balamand Monastery Case[39] can be mentioned, where the Lebanese Judicial Council has found that the men, who placed an explosive device near a monastery in the Balamand region in northern Lebanon with the intent to attack a bus, where Christian religious leaders were found, aimed to cause a state of terror in the respective area. The Council found that such act violated the security of Lebanon. The Trial Chamber of the STL agreed with the interpretation of Article 314 made by the Lebanese Judicial Council in this case,[40] ”given that it simply required the acts be intended to cause a state of terror“.[41] A different solution occurred in the Fatieh Case.[42] A man was accused of throwing explosives at a house twice in order to convince the daughter of the of the family the house belonged to, to marry him. In this case,[43] the Decision of the Lebanese Court of Cassation of 16 November 1953[44] found the man guilty for committing a terrorist act – throwing explosives at a house. It considered that the intent of the perpetrator was to scare the father of the daughter in order to coerce him to allow his daughter to marry him. With this aim, he used explosive devices, which are means of committing a terrorist act included in the Lebanese Criminal Code definition[45] of the crime of terrorism. Unlike the Decision of the Lebanese Court of Cassation of 16 November 1953,[46] the Trial Chamber of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon considered that the act committed by the man did not represent terrorism since the intention was to influence someone for personal reasons, the wish for a marriage.[47] Consequently, the ruling of the Trial Chamber of the Special Tribunal of Lebanon was in contradiction with the Lebanese Court of Cassation Decision of 16 November 1953,[48] which found the man guilty for committing a terrorist act under the Article 314 of the Lebanese Criminal Code.[49]
In this regard, we tend to agree more with the Decision[50] of the Lebanese Court of Cassation, mainly for the reason that the means that have been used by the perpetrator, , namely explosives, represent an important element of terrorism. The result of an action using explosives might be to create a state of terror in the area where the house was located. It may appear that the Lebanese case law is not uniform with respect to the special intent elements of the crime of terrorism under Article 314.[51] In this sense, it can be noted that in the Al Jaran, Al Marout and Magharet el Leimoune Case,[52] the perpetrators who used explosives had not been found guilty of a terrorism act since they only intended to achieve personal objectives or to test the explosives.[53]
Taking into consideration the inconsistency of Lebanese case law, the Appeals Chamber concluded that the ‘special intent’ as to causing a state of terror must be established on a case-by-case basis.[54] Establishing that special intent on a case-by-case basis might be a solution, since it is the most efficient way to exactly determine if the “special intent” element of the terrorism offence is met.
Another interesting element found by the Trial Chamber in its Judgement[55] is the requirement for the perpetratorto be aware that the act was to be committed by means of an explosive device that can create public danger. The Trial Chamber makes an interesting statement: the proof whether the perpetrator is to be made responsible for his actions depends on his knowledge of its actions and his intention.[56] According to the Trial Chamber of the STL, this element includes two parts: firstly, the knowledge that the act has been perpetrated by using an explosive device likely to create a public danger and, secondly, the intent to create a state of terror.[57]
The Chamber argued that Mr. Ayyash must have known that and how Mr. Hariri was going to be murdered, namely by an explosion. It has also been alleged that he had been most likely aware of the place where it was to occur, namely that it was a public place, and about the time, in the middle of a weekday.[58] Consequently, the knowledge part of the mens rea element – the intended aim – was met. Considering the time and place where the detonation occurred, on a public street, in the middle of a weekday, it was clear that the attack would create a state of terror among the population. Consequently, the Trial Chamber concluded beyond reasonable doubt that Mr. Ayyash knew that the means used would create a public danger.[59]
Another element found by the Trial Chamber within its Judgment is represented by the means used when committing a terrorism offence. In the case of Lebanese Criminal Code definition of terrorism, the means used are deemed to create a public danger if the act is committed by using „explosive devices, inflammable materials, toxic or corrosive products and infectious or microbial agents“.[60] The Trial Chamber has found that this element is met in the Ayyash et al. case,[61] taking into consideration the detonation of an explosive device of „2.500 to 3,000 kilograms of TNT equivalent high explosives“.[62]
Regardless the fact that the target was Mr. Rafik Hariri, numerous other persons, including the ones from the Mr. Hariri’s convoy, have been killed since the device exploded in a very busy street on a weekday. Since detonating the device has occurred in such circumstances, it was clear that the attack caused fear, in particular to the members of the public in the area, but also to other inhabitants who afterwards were informed about the event.
Furthermore, regarding the ‘motive element’, which also can be found in the concepts of terrorism developed by other regional[63] and international[64] instruments, the Trial Chamber concluded that the proof of a motive is not required for the indictment. This decision contradicts some of the previous definitions that have been developed in international practice, as mentioned in the Tables 1 and 2.
- The differences between the concept of terrorism in the Lebanese law and international customary law
This part will encompass a comparison between the concepts of terrorism from Lebanese law and from international customary law, as identified by the Appeals Chamber.
First of all, the definition of terrorism in the Lebanese law does not stipulate the requirement of specific motive. The Prosecution and the Trial Chamber in the Case Ayashh et al.[65] rejected the Sabra Defence argument that the motive must be proven in order to establish a terrorist act under Article 314.[66] An important aspect regarding the motive requirement is that the Appeals Chamber of the Special Tribunal of Lebanon stated that the international customary law does not require a political, religious or ideological motive.[67]
Even if the motive requirement might give clarification about the purpose of the offence that is to be prosecuted as a crime of terrorism under the international law, we consider that the concept of the crime of terrorism should not necessarily include a political, religious or ideological motive. For example, the political motive might trigger various interpretations, from different groups of States. Thus, it is not excluded that the motive requirement might hinder the process of the development of a common concept of the crime of terrorism within the international law.
Furthermore, the definition contained within the Disposition of the First Interlocutory Decision[68] of the Appeals Chamber includes an additional element, incriminating, besides the perpetration of an act, the “credible threat of an act”[69] – the actus reus element. Consequently, the Appeals Chamber’s concept of terrorism incriminates both acts and threats. Thus, it is broader that in the concept defined by the Lebanese Criminal Code,[70] according to which the threat itself does not represent an offence.
In addition, the definition provided by the Appeals Chamber in the Disposition[71] does not enumerate the means used, stipulating just that they are means “that are likely to pose a public danger”.[72] By not specifying exactly what the means are, it can be interpretated that both physical and other methods of accomplishing a terrorist act are to be incriminated as long as they pose a public danger.
The Appeals Chamber has taken into account the relevant applicable international law besides the Lebanese Criminal Code.[73] In order to identify the applicable international law, the Appeals Chamber examined the Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism of 22 April 1998,[74] and customary international law. The Arab Convention[75] was the only treaty ratified by the State of Lebanon that contained a definition of the crime of terrorism. The definition is broader and includes the threat of violence, besides the act itself. Furthermore, it incriminates acts that damage the environment and public or private properties, also jeopardizing national resources.
Even if the Appeals Chamber did not directly apply that definition, since the Arab Convention[76] stipulates that its aim is not to substitute its own definition of terrorism for those contained in the national law of the contracting parties, it has however used this definition in order to interpret the Lebanese Criminal Code.[77] Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber of the STL has given a much broader interpretation than the Trials Chamber.
With respect to customary international law, the Appeals Chamber emphasised that a definition of crime of terrorism exists within the body of international customary law, applicable in time of peace, based on different sources at national and international level, such as treaties, UNSC resolutions and national legislation of different states.
By analysing these sources, the Appeals Chamber emphasized that there is a motive requirement for a political, religious, racial or ideological purpose, but it concluded that this element does not yet form part of the customary definition of the crime.[78] The Appeals Chamber intended to ensure consistent interpretation of national legislation with binding relevant international law. The Appeals Chamber stipulated in the definition of the crime of terrorism under customary international law,that the threat of an act should also be a crime.. Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber considers the transnational element part of the customary concept of the crime of terrorism.[79]
Even if the Trial Chamber did not contend that there is an international agreed notion of terrorism, it has made it clear in its judgement that terrorism is one of the most serious and heinous crimes.[80]
- The judicial of the STL and the separate opinion of judge David Re about the shaping of a definition of terrorism within the international customary law
3.1 The innovation of the STL and its relevance for the development of international criminal law
The Appeals Chamber stated that since the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is also a tribunal of an international character, it is obliged to take intoaccount the international lawand it did so even if its Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law[81] stipulated that the Tribunal shall primarily apply national Lebanese law.
By analyzing the international criminal law such as the UN Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions, but also the national laws of States and domestic case law, the Appeals Chamber of the STL offered a judicial innovation: it recognized terrorism as being part of the international customary law and is the first court of an international character, which did so. The crime of terrorism, under customary international law, as identified by the Appeals Chamber contains three elements:
“(i) the perpetration of the criminal act (such as murder, kidnapping, hostage-taking, arson, and so on), or threatening such an act;
(ii) the intent to spread fear among the population (which would generally entail the creation of public danger) or directly or indirectly coerce a national or international authority to take some action, or to refrain from taking it;
(iii) when the act involves a transnational element”.[82]
The concept of terrorism developed by the Appeals Chamber of Tribunal for Lebanon emphasizes the special intent of the perpetrators to spread fear among the population, but also the intent to compel a national or international authority to do a specific act or abstain from doing it. Furthermore, the terrorist act requires a transnational element.
An important aspect regarding the Appeals Chamber of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is the fact that it analyzed many national laws on combating terrorism. It concluded that the common elements of the domestic definitions are: the intent to terrorize the population, to compel a government to do an act or refrain from doing it and the disruption or destabilization of social or political structures.[83] For example, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Tunisia and Egypt prosecute in their national laws criminal offences that endanger social order and spread fear among the population or damage property or infrastructure.[84] In addition, many European countries such as Austria, Belgium, France, Sweden, and UK criminalize in their domestic laws acts that intimidate and spread fear among the population and endanger the social order.[85] The national laws of Latin American countries such as Chile,[86] Colombia,[87] Panama[88] and Peru[89] also incriminate the spread of fear among the population. Furthermore, the element of spreading fear is also encompassed in the national law of the United States.[90]
The conclusion of the Appeals Chamber regarding the common elements of the domestic definitions of the crime of terrorism reveals that State practice supports the outcome that the crime of terrorism is already regarded as a distinct crime under international customary law.
In addition, the concept of the crime of terrorism developed by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon might represent a source of inspiration for other tribunals that include the crime of terrorism within their competence. In this sense, it has been a proposal to take into consideration this concept when developing a proposal for an International Court against Terrorism, presented in 2015 by Romania and Spain.[91]
3.2 Arguments against an international customary law definition of terrorism – the separate opinion of the judge David Re
In his separate opinion, judge David Re affirms that a customary definition of an international crime of terrorism for the peacetime was in the making, or nascent, but it is not already contoured within the international customary law.[92] He emphasizes that there is commonality and convergence between definitions encompassed in UN treaties,[93] UN General Assembly (hereinafter referred to as UN GA) and Security Council Resolutions (hereinafter referred to as SC)[94] and the draft of an UN Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism.[95] Regarding the elements of the crime of terrorism, judge David Re states that at a trend exists at the international level, in the sense that the definitions of terrorism should not limit the means used for to physical means. Furthermore, he argues that he is not convinced about the full crystallization and maturity of a definition of terrorism at the international level because State practice might not be sufficiently consistent.[96]
His contention proves the difficulty of assessing the the current status on the international level – if a definition of terrorism has been shaped yet within the customary international law. An argument raised by judge Re is that the ‘motive element’ is not uniform in all the international and national instruments on terrorism. While the Appeals Chamber considers that the ‘motive element’ or its absence is a minor discrepancy between the concepts of the crime of terrorism in international and national instruments and the complete uniformity of practice is unnecessary, judge Re claims that this element shows the opposite: that there is no international consensus regarding the concept of terrorism. Even if it represents just a particular element of the whole concept of terrorism, it makes the overall agreement of a common international concept of terrorism questionable.[97] On this issue, we are inclined to agree with the opinion of the Appeals Chamber since it is hard to have a totally agreed uniform definition at the international level, taking into consideration the differences and variety of states on the globe.
Another argument and difference in the terrorism concepts around the globe revealed by the judge David Re is related to the actus reus element, stating that in some national criminal laws an act might be directed towards individuals or other targets, non-human ones, such as the property or environment, while other concepts of terrorism are limited to the individuals. Furthermore, he finds another discrepancy: the proof that people have been injured or that a property has been damaged is necessary for a crime to be committed according to certain definitions of terrorism, while other definitions do not require this element, such as the one encompassed within Article 314 of the Lebanese Criminal Code. In addition, he argues that, while some national definitions of terrorism incriminate both the act and the threat of a terrorism offence, others just stipulate the act itself, such as the Article 314.[98]
Consequently, the judge disagrees with the Appeals Chamber that there is a definition of terrorism within the body of international customary law. Moreover, he agrees with the Trial Chamber that a common notion of terrorism has not yet been contoured within the international customary law, but affirms that the international and domestic sources could be used by the TSL as guidance when interpreting the provisions within the Lebanese law.
We firmly believe that the Trial Chamber should have accepted a broader interpretation of the definition of terrorism encompassed within the Lebanese Criminal Code. For example, with respect to the ‘means element’, the Trial Chamber of the Tribunal should have interpreted the disposition regarding the means used in a broader way. An illustrative list rather than a closed list[99] would have been more appropriate in order to encompass a larger spectrum of acts of terrorism, committed by other means than the ones enumerated in the definition. Nevertheless, if one looks strictly at the Ayyash et al. Case,[100] the Trial Chamber did not necessarily need to give a broader interpretation of the provision and the means used, since the definition of terrorism within the Lebanese Criminal Code[101] has already incorporated the means used in the terrorist attack against Mr. Hariri. In the same vein as the separate opinion of the judge David Re, our position is that that a broader reading of the ‘means element’ would facilitate the application of the definition to contemporary forms of terrorism. Even if for the purpose of cases before the Tribunal this interpretation was not necessarily, the broader reading is more useful for the development of international law.
- Conclusion
The case law of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is very relevant for the development of the notion of the crime of terrorism and the development of the international criminal law. The findings of the Appeals Chamber of the STL in the Ayyash et el. Case[102] are of high importance for the further development of international criminal law because they might represent a source of inspiration, in the future, for other tribunals and for the development of a common agreed notion of terrorism within the public international law. Furthermore, the definition of the crime of terrorism proposed by the Appeals Chamber of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is very relevant because it brings into light that the State practice supports the outcome that the crime of terrorism is already regarded as a distinct crime within the customary international law.
The elements of the crime of terrorism identified by the Appeals Chamber, as well as the comparison with elements contained in the the relevant case law of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, might prove important for the further development of a uniform commonly agreed notion of the crime of terrorism within the international criminal law.
* PhD candidate, Faculty of Law, University of Bucharest, e-mail: solea.ralucaandreea@yahoo.ro. The opinions expressed in this paper are solely the author’s and do not engage the institution she belongs to.
[1] United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1664, 29 March 2006, S/RES/1664.
[2] UNSC, Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (Preamble), 30 May 2007.
[3] UNSC, Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 30 May 2007, Art. 2.
[4]Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, Special Tribunal for Lebanon (Appeals Chamber), Case No. STL–11–01/1, 2011, pp. 14-15, para 15.
[5] See The Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL, 16 February 2011.
[6] See The Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL, Judgement STL-11-01/T/TC, 18 August 2020.
[7] See The Prosecutor v. Salim Jamil Ayyash, STL, Sentencing Judgement, STL-11-01/S/TC, 11 December 2020.
[8] Bogdan Aurescu, Ion Gâlea, Elena Lazăr, Ioana Oltean, Drept International Public, Scurta culegere de jurisprudenta pentru seminar, Ed. Hamangiu 2018, p. 213
[9] See The Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL, Judgement STL-11-01/T/TC, 18 August 2020.
[10] Ibid., p. 2162.
[11] Ibid., p. 2163.
[12] STL Bulletin, September – December 2020.
[13] See The Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL, Judgement STL-11-01/T/TC, 18 August 2020.
[14] Ibid.
[15] See Prosecutor v. Merhi and Oneissi, STL-11-01, (formerly, Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al.).
[16]https://www.stl-tsl.org/en/media/press-releases/stl-appeals-chamber-schedules-pronouncement-of-the-appeal-judgment-in-the-case-of-prosecutor-v-merhi-and-oneissi-stl-11-01-for-thursday-10-march-2022.
[17] Lebanese Criminal Code, 1943, Art. 314.
[18] Ibid.
[19] League of Arab States, Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, 1998.
[20] African Unity, Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 1999.
[21] Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, 2001.
[22] European Union, EU Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, 2002.
[23] League of Nations, Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court, 1937.
[24] United Nations, Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, ILC, 1954.
[25] United Nations, Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, ILC, 1991.
[26] United Nations, Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, ILC, 1995.
[27] US Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International Terrorism, 1972.
[28] United Nations, Draft Rome Statute, 1998.
[29] United Nations, Draft Comprehensive Convention, 2000.
[30] United Nations, Resolution 1566, Security Council, 2004.
[31] Lebanese Criminal Code, 1943, Art. 314.
[32] See Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, Special Tribunal for Lebanon (Appeals Chamber), Case No. STL–11–01/1, 2011.
[33] Lebanese Criminal Code, 1943, Art. 314.
[34] See Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, Special Tribunal for Lebanon (Appeals Chamber), Case No. STL–11–01/1, 2011, para. 85.
[35] See Ayyash et el., STL, First interlocutory decision on applicable law, paras 49, 57, 147 (c), disposition: 3 (c).
[36] Lebanese Criminal Code, 1943, Art. 314.
[37] Ibid.
[38] See The Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL, Judgement STL-11-01/T/TC, 18 August 2020, p. 2023.
[39] Balamand Monastery Attempted Bombing Case, Lebanese Judicial Council, Judgment No. 3, 26 October 1994.
[40] Ibid.
[41] See The Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL, Judgement STL-11-01/T/TC, 18 August 2020, p. 2024.
[42] See Fatieh Case, Lebanese Court of Cassation, Cassation Decision No. 334, 1953.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Lebanese Criminal Code, 1943, Art. 314.
[46] See Fatieh Case, Lebanese Court of Cassation, Cassation Decision No. 334, 1953.
[47] See The Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL, Judgement STL-11-01/T/TC, 18 August 2020, p. 2024.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Lebanese Criminal Code, 1943, Art. 314.
[50] See Fatieh Case, Lebanese Court of Cassation, Cassation Decision No. 334, 1953.
[51] Lebanese Criminal Code, 1943, Art. 314.
[52] See Al Jaran, Al Marout and Magharet el Leimoune Case, Lebanese Court of Cassation, Cassation Decision, No. 85, 1998.
[53] See Al Jaran, Al Marout and Magharet el Leimoune Case, Lebanese Court of Cassation, Cassation Decision, No. 85, 1998, p.5.
[54] See The Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL, Judgement STL-11-01/T/TC, 18 August 2020, p. 2025.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Ibid., p. 2190.
[57] Ibid.
[58] Ibid., p. 2192.
[59] Ibid., p. 2193.
[60] Lebanese Criminal Code, 1943.
[61] See The Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL, 16 February 2011.
[62] See The Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL, Judgement STL-11-01/T/TC, 18 August 2020, p. 2074.
[63] Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, 2001.
European Union, EU Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, 2002.
[64] United Nations, Draft Rome Statute, 1998;
United Nations, Draft Comprehensive Convention, 2000;
United Nations, Resolution 1566, Security Council, 2004.
[65] See The Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL, 16 February 2011.
[66] See The Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL, Judgement STL-11-01/T/TC, 18 August 2020, p. 2027.
[67]See Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, Special Tribunal for Lebanon (Appeals Chamber), STL-11-O1/I, 16 February 2011, paras 98, 100, 106.
[68] Disposition of the First Interlocutory Decision, STL, p. 2375, para. 3.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Lebanese Criminal Code, 1943.
[71] Disposition of the First Interlocutory Decision, STL, p. 2375, para. 3.
[72] See The Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL, Judgement STL-11-01/T/TC, 18 August 2020, p. 2027.
[73] Lebanese Criminal Code, 1943.
[74] League of Arab States, Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, 22 April 1998.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Ibid.
[77] Lebanese Criminal Code, 1943.
[78] See The Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL, Judgement STL-11-01/T/TC, 18 August 2020, p. 2379.
[79] See Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, Special Tribunal for Lebanon (Appeals Chamber), STL-11-O1/I, 16 February 2011, paras 91, 111, 124.
[80] See The Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL, Judgement STL-11-01/T/TC, 18 August 2020, p. 284.
[81] See Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, Special Tribunal for Lebanon (Appeals Chamber), STL-11-O1/I, 16 February 2011, para. 33.
[82] See Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, Special Tribunal for Lebanon (Appeals Chamber), Case No. STL–11–01/1, 2011, para. 85.
[83] See Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, Special Tribunal for Lebanon (Appeals Chamber), Case No. STL–11–01/1, 2011, para. 93.
[84] See the Penal Code of Jordan, 1960, Art. 147(1);
See United Arab Emirates Decree by Federal Law No. I of 2004 on Combating Terrorist Offences, 2004, Art. 2.
See Iraq: Anti-Terrorism Law (Law No. 13 of 2005), 7 November 2005, Art. 1 and 2;
See Tunisian Law 2003-75 against Terrorism and Money-Laundering, 10 December 2003, Art. 4;
See Penal Code [Egypt], No. 58 of 1937, August 1937, Art. 86.
[85] See Austrian Criminal Code, 1974, Section 278c; Belgian Criminal Code, 1867, Art. 137 para I; French Criminal Code, 1810, Art. 421-I; Swedish Law (2003:148) on the crime of terrorism, 2003, Section 2; UK Terrorism Act 2000; as amended by the Terrorism Act 2006 and Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, Section 1.
[86] Chile’s anti-terrorism law (Law No.18,314), 1984, Art. 1 and 2.
[87] Colombian Penal Code, 1936, Art. 343.
[88] Criminal Code of the Republic of Panama, 2007, Art. 287.
[89] Peru’s Decree Law No. 25475, 1992, Art. 2.
[90] US Code, 1988, Title 18, Part I, Chapter 113B § 2331.
[91] Bogdan Aurescu and Ion Gâlea, Establishing an International Court against Terrorism, Constitutional Law Review, 2015.
[92] See The Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL, Judgement STL-11-01/T/TC, 18 August 2020, p. 2383.
[93] United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 704, p. 219, Convention on Offences and Certain other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Tokyo, 4 September 1963;
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1670, p. 343, Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Hague, 16 December 1970.
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1035, p. 167, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, New York, 14 December 1973.
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1316, p. 205, International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, New York, 17 December 1979;
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1456, p. 101, Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, New York, 8 February 1980.
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1589, p. 474, Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Montreal, 24 February 1988.
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1678, p. 222, Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation,Rome, 10 March 1988.
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1678, p. 304, Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, 1988.
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 134, Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, 1 March 1991.
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2149, p. 256, International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, New York, 15 December 1997.
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2178, p. 197, International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, New York, 9 December 1999.
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2445, p. 89, International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, New York, 13 April 2005.
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 3132, Amendments to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Vienna, 8 July 2005.
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1678, p. 222, Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 14 October 2005;
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1678, Protocol of 2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, Rome, 14 October 2005.
United Nations, Treaty Series, Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation, Beijing, 10 September 2010.
United Nations, Treaty Series, Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Beijing, 10 September 2010;
United Nations, Treaty Series, Protocol to Amend the Convention on Offences and Certain Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Montréal, 4 April 2014.
[94]UNSC Resolution 1373, 2001. Resolution 1377 (2001); Resolution 1368 (2001); Resolution 1438 (2002); resolution 1440 (2002); Resolution 1450 (2002); Resolution 1456, 2003; resolution 1516 (2003); resolution 1530 (2004); resolution 1611 (2005); resolution 1618 (2005); Resolution 1390 (2002); Resolution 1452 (2002); Resolution 1455 (2003); Resolution 1456 (2003); Resolution 1526 (2004); Resolution 1535 (2004); Resolution 1540 (2004); Resolution 1617 (2005);47 Resolution 1624 (2005);48 Resolution 1735 (2006).
[95] UN Draft Comprehensive Convention, 2000.
[96] See The Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL, Judgement STL-11-01/T/TC, 18 August 2020, p. 2385.
[97] See The Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL, Judgement STL-11-01/T/TC, 18 August 2020, 2386.
[98] Ibid.
[99] Lebanese Criminal Code, 1943, Art. 314.
[100] See The Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL, 16 February 2011.
[101] Lebanese Criminal Code, 1943, Art. 314.
[102] See The Prosecutor v. Ayyash et al., STL, 16 February 2011.
